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I. Introduction
This report summarizes a study of education finance and economic
development for the South Carolina School Boards Association. It extends
research conducted during the summer of 1999 by the same research team for
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the Horry County School Board. The SCSBA wanted to expand the research
conducted for Horry County and explore the statewide implications of a
potential conflict between the financing of education and local economic
development.
In June, 1999, the Horry County Board of Education commissioned a review
and analysis of a proposal for a large-scale economic development project and
its impacts on the School District. The proposal, presented to Horry County
Council and the City of Myrtle Beach by a local development company, calls
for the creation of a Multi-County Business Park (MCBP) in the county
covering approximately 8,300 acres. The proposal would create a MCBP for up
to 30 years with an option to renew for another 30 years, facilitate the
annexation of several thousand acres of land into the City of Myrtle Beach,
freeze zoning and limit impact fees in the Park and use 100% of commercial
property tax revenues for non-educational purposes.
The Horry County Board of Education was concerned about the long-term
implications of this proposal on the ability of the District to fund educational
services in the District. The developer's proposal would remove over $2 billion
in commercial property from the School District's tax base. Locked into a 30-60
year plan, the District was concerned that this could have a detrimental impact
on the District's ability to fund education in Horry County in the future. By
removing such a large and important component from the tax base, the District
faces shifting the tax burden to other property owners in the County in order to
maintain the quality of education.
To address these issues and others, the School district selected a team of
researchers from across the state to review and analyze the Horry County
development proposal. The team included the following members:
Holley Hewitt Ulbrich, Alumni Distinguished Professor Emerita of
Economics at Clemson University and Senior Fellow at Strom Thurmond
Institute and USC's Institute of Public Affairs
Edward Lewis Bryan, Professor of Accounting at Clemson.
Frank L. Hefner, Associate Professor, Department of Economics and
Finance at the College of Charleston.
Douglas P. Woodward, Director of the Division of Research and
Associate Professor of Economics at the University of South Carolina's
Darla Moore School of Business.
Harry W. Miley Jr., President, Miley & Associates, Inc.
Randolph C. Martin, Professor of Economics and Associate Dean, Darla
Moore School of Business, University of South Carolina.
The present study was conducted by the same team of researchers except Dr.
Lewis Bryan of Clemson University. This report presents the results of the
research team's analysis. Section II begins with an overview of the use of
development incentives in economic development. Section III reviews of the
major economic development incentives used in South Carolina that affect a
school district's tax base.
Section IV provides an analysis of the relationship between economic growth in
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school districts and property tax rates and other fiscal variables. Section V
provides a review of South Carolina's neighboring states' property tax related
incentives. To conclude, Section VI provides recommendations and identifies
further issues to be explored.

II. Historical Overview of Economic Development Incentives
During the past two decades, state and local government involvement in
promoting economic development has expanded significantly. In earlier,
post-WWII years, the federal government had taken it upon itself to assist in the
economic development of the most distressed areas in the country through a
variety of programs. The best know of which were administered by the
Economic Development Administration (EDA). Such programs included low
interest rate loans for firms locating in qualified areas plus a variety of technical
assistance activities. During the Reagan years, however, a conservative turn in
political philosophies plus growing budget deficits resulted in a significant
reduction in federal funding of programs for lagging or distressed regions. Thus,
state and local governments were left to fill what was perceived as a gap in
programs designed to assist those living these distressed areas. In addition,
competition among states and localities over the last 30 years has also
contributed to this growth in state and local incentives. The extent of this
expansion has been documented by Chi and Leathery and Fisher and Peters.
Much of South Carolina as well as much of the Southeastern United States has
qualified as distressed areas for many of the early federal programs. While the
list of programs is long, the focus of this section is with those programs
designed to directly assist businesses (either new or existing) in the area.
Economist Timothy Bartik provides a useful "topology" of state and local
economic development policies that directly aid businesses. Included in the
more traditional category of such policies are financial and other incentives,
which are designed to attract new industry and expand existing area industries.
Much of this is accomplished through the state and local tax system and has
been traditionally targeted at attracting new manufacturing plants. A second and
more recent summary of economic development programs focus more on
smaller or existing businesses. Such programs include capital market programs
(e.g., government financed equity or loan programs), information, education and
technical assistance for small business, research and high technology (e.g.,
research parks), and export assistance programs. In all, the list of state and
locally provided economic development programs is quite extensive.
Are economic development incentives effective?
The growth in state and local government offers of direct economic incentives
to businesses over the past decades reflects an intense competition as areas vie
for new plants and other economic development opportunities. This kind of
competition was especially apparent in the Southeast during the 1980s and early
1990s, as states and localities vied for the location of highly visible Japanese
and European automobile producers into U.S. greenfield sites. Such high profile
events and the rapid growth in state and local subsidies to the business sector
has raised the obvious question; are such programs worthwhile or effective?
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The answer to this question may depend on how one defines "worthwhile or
effective" and how one views the evidence available on this subject.
In recent years, the more vocal of those concerned with such issues have been
the opponents of using business incentives for economic development purposes.
Chi and Leatherby provide a useful "check-list" of the pros and cons associated
with such business incentives. Included in the list of arguments used to
discourage the use of incentives are:
Tax and financial incentives are not the only factors included in business
location decisions.
Incentives raise questions of equity.
Empirical studies show that business incentives are not cost-effective.
Incentives pull dollars away from the improvement of public services and
infrastructure.
Incentives create a self-defeating zero-sum game.
Consider the first item. It is argued that many other factors (labor cost,
proximity to markets, unions, etc.) play a more important role in determining
the location of a firm than do marginal differences in taxes or other financial
considerations. Thus, such policies have little impact on location decisions. In a
recent study of industrial location in Puerto Rico, the researchers found that a
targeted incentive policy affected the decisions of relatively few greenfield
plants investments.
Opponents of such incentives are also able to point to selected studies in the
literature which raise some real questions about the effectiveness of business
incentives in creating employment opportunities, especially for the locally
unemployed. It is often argued that with a mobile labor force, new jobs are
filled by more skilled immigrants, leaving the unemployed in the area no better
off than before the new plant opening.
Critics also point out that public funds used for incentives often have a very
high opportunity cost. In states with lagging infrastructure and below average
school systems, such incentives may come at a very high cost in terms of other
uses of the tax revenue foregone. Finally, there is the "zero-sum game"
argument. If it is assumed that state and local governments compete for a fixed
number of new firms, then a plant that decides to locate in one area is lost to the
others. From a national perspective, the net effect of local incentives on job
creation is zero and the opportunity cost of using local public resources is very
high. The issue of the net impact of economic development, with or without
incentives, on local public services (including schools) is an important and
controversial one. Part III of this report explores that question in the specific
context of South Carolina school districts.
The other side of the coin is a similar list of positive arguments. These items
include reasons that business incentives should be provide by state and local
governments. The "pros" list contains the following items:
Incentives have a positive effect on business location decisions.
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Incentives fund job creation.
Incentives are cost-effective.
Incentives help foster competition.
Incentives have a political element.
In this view, tax and financial incentives do have an impact on firm location.
Specifically, the argument is that many state and metropolitan areas are close
substitutes as potential industrial sites from a business perspective. Thus, even a
small cost differential provided by tax or financial incentives can prove to be
decisive in the location decision.
The second item represents the argument that new firms attracted by the
incentives create net additional jobs for the local area. From a local perspective
the "zero sum game" argument is irrelevant. Even from a national perspective, it
can be argued that it is desirable if jobs are "taken" from low unemployment
areas and "given" to high unemployment areas because the social benefits of
these jobs is higher in the high unemployment area. It is also possible that
competition for jobs between states and areas may actually reduce overall
unemployment and increase national output.
The third item in the "pro" list indicates a belief that such incentives are costeffective, which means that the benefits (wages earned, taxes paid, etc.)
outweigh the costs (opportunity cost of incentives given). A positive
cost/benefit ratio is even more likely when the multiplier or spillover benefits of
an expanded industrial base are included in the calculation.
The last two items are concerned with the competitive nature of state and local
incentives to business. First, the competition between areas can be viewed as a
positive factor as noted in the discussion of job creation. The wisdom of one
area unilaterally withdrawing from this competition is also certainly
questionable. Also, local leaders unquestionably feel pressure to attract
business, especially in areas of high unemployment. Thus, the political process
leads to the desirable result that those areas that stand to gain the most from
such incentives are most motivated to provide those incentives.
To summarize this brief review of economic development incentives, it is
apparent that:
Incentives were originally intended to promote jobs and income creation
for economically distressed areas.
Incentives were originally a federal government activity but their use by
local and state governments has substantially grown over the last 20
years.
Incentives were originally intended for relatively, footloose
manufacturing plants.
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Incentives were originally intended to act as a locational attraction factor
to reduce costs that would help entice industry to move to an area.
Incentives are generally intended to encourage economic activity that
would otherwise locate elsewhere.
Incentives raise questions of equity.
Incentives may pull dollars away from the improvement of public
services and infrastructure.
Incentives may or may not be cost-effective.
Incentives can help job creation.
Incentives can help attract new industry.
As a leader in using incentives, South Carolina demonstrates both the pro and
cons of using a targeted industrial policy approach to economic development.
Over time, the programs used both at the state and local level to attract industry
have proliferated. In some cases, the scope of the incentive programs have
expanded considerably beyond their original intent. The promise has always
been, however, that the benefits to the local community will appear over time.
The next section examines whether this has been the case for the state's school
districts.

III. Growth and schools
Value of economic growth
There is little dispute about the value and importance of economic growth and
development for South Carolina. The state remains near the bottom of the fifty
states in such measures as personal income, health status, SAT scores, infant
mortality, and other measures of quality of life that are highly correlated with
the quality and diversity of the state's economic base. Economic growth offers
the incentive, the opportunities, and the resources to change these measures of
economic and social well-being.
Schools and school districts are important players in economic growth in
several dimensions. The quality of the public schools is an important factor in
locational decisions for business firms in deciding to move in, expand, contract,
or shut down plants. Firms need educated workers. Management and workers
want quality education for their own children. School millage is often an
important factor in locational choice as well, because the correlation between
local taxes and school quality or even school spending is weak. A district that is
already well endowed with a tax base can raise more revenue with a low mill
rate than another district can with a much higher rate. State equalization through
formula funding is not adequate to significantly alter that situation which
handicaps poorer districts both in attracting industry and in providing quality
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education. So school districts are an important factor in fostering economic
growth.
On the other side of the equation, economic growth affects schools. Nationally,
there is evidence that rapid growth puts strains on both operating and capital
budgets for local governments, including schools, even in the absence of any tax
incentives that might drain potential revenue from schools. Residential
development in particular tends to add more to the cost than the revenue side of
local government budgets. Loudon County, Virginia, just outside Washington
D.C., offers one good example:
"In Loudon County, Virginia, officials in 1994 estimated that a
new
home must sell for at least $400,000 to bring in sufficient
property taxes to cover the cost of all the services the county
provides. By contrast, the average home sold that year for
less than $200,000. The fastest selling properties in 1995
were town homes averaging between $120,000 and
$160,000."
This estimate confirmed an earlier study in Culpepper County, Virginia, which
found that residential development cost $1.25 in county services (including
schools) for every $1 of revenue, while service costs were only 19 cents per
dollar of revenue generated for industrial, commercial, or agricultural land.
Likewise, a study by the American Farmland Trust found a revenue-to-cost ratio
for residential property is 1:1.11, while the ratios are 1:0.29 for commercial and
industrial property and 1:0.31 for farmland, forests and open space. In other
words, residential property generates 11% more in costs than it produces in
revenue, while commercial and industrial property only costs 29 cents and
farmland and open space 31 cents in services for every dollar generated in
revenue. However, these ratios may overstate the benefits of nonresidential
development. According to one researcher:
"A 1991 study by the DuPage County, Illinois Development
Department found that, between 1986 and 1989, areas of
the county with significant nonresidential development
experienced a greater increase in taxes than did areas
without nonresidential development . . . commercial
development may create a demand for additional nearby
residential development which . . . brings a fiscal drain that
offsets the benefits."
The impact of nonresidential development on school finances is the central
question of this chapter.
Sources of school district revenue
What happens to school funding as new plants open and new pupils come into a
school district? In order to answer that question, it is helpful to consider the
sources of school funding. Schools get their funding from two major sources:
the property tax (28%) and various kinds of state aid (44%). There are also three

6/21/2007 6:20 PM

Impact Study

8 of 40

http://www.strom.clemson.edu/teams/ced/impacts.html

minor sources: fees and charges (5%), miscellaneous revenue (6%), and federal
aid (7%). In addition, they can issue bonds for capital improvements subject to
constraints on their bonded indebtedness, which in 1996-97 accounted for the
remaining 10%. For purposes of this study, we focus entirely on property tax
revenue and state aid because the other sources are minor and also much less
likely to increase in response to either new industry or more pupils.

Table 1
South Carolina School District Revenues, 1996-97
Total Revenue
Total Revenue

Revenues

Per cent of total

$4,424,572,449

Own source revenue

2,167,535,700

49.0

current property taxes

1,239,054,910

28.0

service charges

222,607,331

5.0

bonds and leases

443,678,449

10.0

miscellaneous

262,195,010

5.9

1,955,667,895

44.2

212,936,953

4.8

aid to subdivisions

17,430,034

0.4

homestead exemption reimb.

19,295,990

0.4

state grants

416,207,647

9.4

Education Finance Act

942,170,022

21.3

Education Improvement Act

301,368,854

7.9

Federal aid

301,368,854

6.8

Revenue from state sources
property tax relief reimb.

State aid. New pupils will generate more state aid. In the current year, one
weighted average pupil would, in the average district in 1996-7, bring in an
additional $2,650 in Education Finance Act (EFA) funding and some additional
EIA funding, depending on available funds. In 1996-97, the average per pupil
EIA funding was $530, for a total of $3,180 in state funds per pupil. However,
the average per pupil expenditure in that same year was $6,526. Additional state
aid covers less than half the additional cost on average. Clearly additional local
revenues must be generated if the school districts are to fund the additional cost
of new pupils generated by economic development. A district that is
experiencing rapid growth in its tax base will also see an increase in its index of
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taxpaying ability, which is part of the EFA funding formula. Its per pupil
allotment, relative to the state average, will decline, because its enhanced
property tax base is expected to make up some of the difference.
Property taxes. Most of the local share of school funding comes from property
taxes, a base that is shared with cities and counties. Over the period 1990 to
1996, the assessed value of property grew at an average annual rate of 4.9%.
The combined demands of inflation and pupil growth required a growth in tax
revenue of 3.6%. Any increase in costs over and above those two sources had to
come out of the difference of 1.3% between tax-base growth and inflation/pupil
growth, or in the form of higher millage, or some of each. School millage rates
have increased at an average rate of 1.6% from 1990-91 to 1996-97.
Legislative changes in property tax structure in the early 1990s were designed to
protect school revenue while reducing the tax burden on specific groups, such
as new and expanding industry and homeowners. Currently, school district
revenues are at risk in at least two respects: the potential effect on school
districts from existing and future county-negotiated property tax breaks to
business firms, and the proposed change in the assessment rate on automobiles.
Personal vehicles account for 18% of the property tax base. A reduction in the
assessment rate on automobiles from 10.5% to 6% would, other things equal,
reduce the property tax base by almost 8%.
The concern in this report is only with the changing property tax implications of
business firms. The next section presents an analysis of industrial (and utility)
property in recent years.
Industrial Property and School Revenue: 1997 comparisons
Using data from South Carolina Department of Education and the Department
of Revenue, it is possible to sort school districts into those with high, low, and
average shares of industrial and utility property in the appraised values of
property that goes into their tax bases. This sorting makes it possible to explore
differences in educational finance--mill rates, per pupil local and state revenues,
and per pupil expenditures--in relation to the degree of industrial development.
This industrial development measure, rather than one that also included
commercial development, was chosen for several reasons:
1. Manufacturing, utility, and associated business personal property is
assessed annually by the Department of Revenue and is therefore not
subject to variations in county reassessments.
2. Most of the business tax incentives are aimed at and used for industrial
and utility development.
3. It is difficult to separate commercial from residential rental property in
the available data.
District size. It is difficult to make meaningful comparisons among districts of
vastly different sizes. Some of this problem is overcome by making percentage
share comparisons or by measuring everything on a per pupil basis, but even
those corrections do not fully capture the differences between small and large
districts. For some of our analysis, therefore, the state's districts were sorted into
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four size classes as shown in Table 2.

Table 2
Size classes of South Carolina School Districts, 199
Size Class

Number of Districts in Class

Under 2000 ADM

16

2000 - 6000 ADM

25

6000 -12000 ADM

18

Over 12000 ADM

14

Sorting districts by degree of industrialization. Sorting by degree of
industrialization yields meaningful categories for all but the coastal districts,
which have a low percentage of their tax bases in industrial and utility property
but still have high per capita or per pupil values of property because of
extensive commercial development and high values for residential property. In a
second sort that identified districts with very low shares of industrial and
commercial property but per pupil total property values well above the state
average, two groups of school districts fell out. One group was, as expected, the
coastal districts of Beaufort, Horry, and Charleston. The others were generally
urban or bedroom communities-- Lexington 3 and 5, Richland 2, Clarendon1,
and Dorchester 2. These eight districts were analyzed separately as Subgroup E.
Because of recent consolidation of school districts in Orangeburg County, it is
difficult to find satisfactory comparison data for the old and new Orangeburg
County districts. These three districts were therefore not included in the study.
What remains are a total of 76 districts with two different property tax-base
mixes, each divided into two subgroups: There are 33 districts below the state
average of 21.22% of assessed value in the tax base from state-assessed
property.
Subgroup A consists of 13 districts (noncoastal/bedroom) with less than 15% of
the value in state-assessed property: These are the least industrialized
noncoastal, nonbedroom districts. Within this group, there are seven very small
districts (less than 2,000 students) and six small districts (2-6,000 students).
Subgroup B consisted of the other 20 districts with 15-21.1% of their property
tax bases consisting of state-assessed property.
There are 43 districts above the state average of 21.22% of value in the tax base
from state-assessed property (37 districts).
Subgroup C consists of 29 districts with 21.3% to 33.7% of their property tax
bases consisting of state-assessed property.

6/21/2007 6:20 PM

Impact Study

11 of 40

http://www.strom.clemson.edu/teams/ced/impacts.html

Subgroups B and C contain a cross section of size classes, as might be
expected: 5 in the smallest size class, 21 in the second size class, 15 in the
middle size class, 4 in the 12-24,000 class, and 3 of the state's five very large
districts.
Subgroup D consists of 14 districts with more than 35% of the appraised value
in state-assessed property. These districts are the most industrialized districts. A
large industrial share often reflects a low commercial share, so the state's largest
districts are not represented in this category because they are in urban counties
with extensive commercial development. This group contained only three of the
very small districts, 7 small districts, 3 medium sized districts and one in the
second largest size class (12-24,000 ADM). A listing of the districts in the least
and most industrialized classes is provided in Appendix B.
Differences between groups. There are some notable differences between
subgroups relative to state averages in some important fiscal characteristics:
mill rates, local revenue per pupil, state revenue per pupil, operating
expenditures per pupil, and per pupil local revenue per mill. The mill rate is a
measure of the tax burden on the average household or firm. Local revenue per
pupil reflects both the mill rate and the tax base. State revenue per pupil reflects
both local taxpaying ability and special needs in terms of pupil mix, and would
normally be expected to be lower in districts that had a large amount of DOR
assessed property in the tax base. Finally, revenue per pupil per mill is an index
of the tax capacity of the district, adjusted for district size.
Table 3 shows the average values for each of these fiscal measures for each of
the subgroups.

Table 3
Fiscal Characteristics and Degree of Industrialization
by School Districts
1996-97
Mill
Local
Local
State
Operating
rate
revenue
revenue revenue expenditures
per
per pupil
per pupil per pupil per pupil
pupil
per mill
Subgroup A
(Least industrial)

149.2

$1493

$3556

$5691

11.15

Subgroups A and
B
141.1
(Below average
industrial)

$1497

$3047

$5029

11.50

141.4

$1872

$2880

$5155

13.24

Subgroups C and
146.9
D

$1888

$2885

$5185

17.09

State Average
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(Above average
industrial)
Subgroup D
(Most industrial)

146.8

$2622

$2729

$5626

18.72

Subgroup E
(Coastal and
urban/bedroom)

141.2

$1817

$2513

$4797

13.12

The highest average mill rate, as expected, was in the least industrial districts
(A), where residential, commercial, and personal vehicle property taxes had to
carry the cost of paying for schools. But mill rates were also substantially above
the state average in more industrialized districts (C and D), while the average
mill rate was lower in slightly less than average industrial districts (B) and in
coastal and bedroom districts (E).
Other results are much more consistent with expectations. Lower local revenue
per pupil and revenue per mill and higher state revenue per pupil are found in
the least and less industrial districts, compared to average figures for both in the
more industrial districts. Somewhat surprising are below average figures for all
fiscal categories in coastal and urban/bedroom districts. These districts have
lower millage, lower per pupil expenditures, lower state revenue per pupil, and
slightly lower than average local revenue per pupil and revenue per pupil per
mill.
These figures suggest that in general a strong industrial base makes it possible
to generate more school revenue. The most industrial group had the highest
local revenue per pupil, in part because of an above average mill rate but also
because each mill generated more revenue per pupil than in any of the other size
classes.
It is likely that district size within subgroups is influencing these results, so
districts were sorted into four groups (see Table 2) according to ADM. Within
each group we computed average millage in the low-industrial and
high-industrial group, and also examined the correlation between the degree of
industrialization and other fiscal measures. Table 4 summarizes the average
millage by size class and extent of industrialization.
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Table 4
Millage, Size Class, and Tax-Base Composition
Size Class

Percent Industrial Average Millage
< 15.2%

189

19.6% to 52.3%

169

< 15.1%

165

16.6% to 67.9%

148

all above 15%

141

< 12%

142

17% to 89%

151

1 (< 2000 ADM)

2 (2 - 6000 ADM)
3 (6 - 12000 ADM)
4/5 (12000 + ADM)

It appears that in very small districts a larger industrial base is associated with
lower average school millage, but in the largest size classes the opposite is true.
These figures suggest that a strategy of seeking industry to fund the schools
remains attractive to smaller districts, but may be of less benefit in larger
districts with a more diversified tax base and perhaps more problems of
congestion.
Correlation analysis yielded some interesting insights in terms of local revenue
per pupil. There is a high and positive correlation (.84 for size class 1, .70 for
size class 2) between the share of DOR-assessed property in the tax base and
local revenue per pupil in the two smallest size classes. However, there is a very
low correlation in the middle size class and a weak but negative relationship in
the largest size class. This finding reinforces the suggestion that there is greater
benefit in seeking industrial development in the smaller, less industrialized
districts than larger ones. This factor should be taken into account in the
differential incentives offered at the state level for industrial location.
Fiscal autonomy
Next, there is the issue of whether fiscal autonomy interacts with the
composition of the tax base in any significant way. To explore this issue, we
sorted districts into those with no, limited, or full fiscal authority. Districts with
limited fiscal autonomy in the lowest size class had higher average mill rates
than those with no fiscal autonomy (there was only one district in the smallest
size class with full fiscal autonomy). In the second smallest size class, 2-6,000
ADM, the average mill rate was lowest in the districts with no fiscal autonomy
(141), slightly higher in those with limited autonomy (147), and considerably
higher in those with full fiscal autonomy (173), the pattern one might expect.
However, the pattern did not hold for districts with more than 6,000 ADM.
Among these districts, the differences in average mill rates were small, and the
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lowest average mill rate (139) was in the limited autonomy districts, followed
by the no autonomy districts (average mill rate, 144), with the highest mill rate
in the full autonomy districts (average mill rate, 157). In summary, there is no
clear pattern linking fiscal autonomy and mill rates in relation to degree of
industrialization, but fiscal autonomy does appear to be related to mill rates
after adjusting for district size.
Growth, change, and fiscal indicators
While the snapshot across districts in 1996-97 offers some insights into the
relationship between industrialization and fiscal variables, our primary concern
is with the changes that take place when economic growth occurs in the form of
expanding the industrial base. The expectation that expansion of a district's
industrial base will lower school mill rates does not appear to be justified.
Regression analysis confirms this finding. Neither growth in the industrial share
of the tax base (1987-97) nor growth in per pupil DOR-assessed property is
related in any statistically significant way to the 1997 school millage rate.
Likewise, neither industrial growth nor industrial share of the tax base
contributed in any identifiable way to explaining growth in school millage over
the same period.
There is a positive relationship between the growth in the industrial/utility share
of the tax base and growth in local revenue per pupil. The relationship is
statistically robust, but the magnitude is rather small. A one percentage point
growth in the industrial/utility share of the tax base results in just a 0.3%
increase in per pupil local revenue. The same is true of growth in
DOR-assessed (industrial/utility) property per pupil: there is a small but
statistically significant positive relationship of about the same magnitude, a
0.3% increase in per pupil local revenue for every 1% increase in DOR-assessed
property in the district. This small effect may be partly the result of the use of
industrial location incentives, which could not be determined from the statistical
model. However, the growth in DOR-assessed property has a statistically
significant and negative effect on state aid to local districts that is larger in
magnitude than the effect on local revenue. A 1% increase in DOR-assessed
property in a district results in a decline ranging from 1% to 3% in state aid per
pupil, depending on the model specification. If state aid constitutes 44% of a
district's revenues, then on average, a 1% increase in DOR-assessed property
will increase local revenues and decrease state aid per pupil so that there is a
net revenue loss, ranging from 0.3% to 1.2% of per pupil revenue.
Moreover, one might ask about the impact of industrial growth on school
spending. Several factors enter into spending, including both cost factors of
serving a larger population and industry demands for quality schools. The
regression results on this question are difficult to interpret, because growth in
industrial share of the tax base and growth of DOR-assessed property per pupil
appear to have opposite effects on total expenditures per pupil. Growth in
DOR-assessed property per pupil has a significant positive (but modest) effect
on per pupil spending, about a 0.1% increase for every 1% increase in the
industrial/utility tax base per pupil. However, growth in the share of
DOR-assessed property in the tax base has a significant negative effect on per
pupil spending, also quite modest (0.15% for every one percentage point
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increase in the tax-base share). The first finding is in keeping with national
studies that find rising school costs with pupil growth as transportation routes
must be extended, teachers attracted, and more classrooms constructed, as well
as the need to accommodate new industry's demands for better prepared
workers. The increase share of industry in the tax base is somewhat different,
because it implies that industry has been growing faster than other categories of
property associated with population (and pupil) growth--houses, rental property,
commercial facilities, and personal vehicles. If industry is growing faster than
student population in some districts, then these cost factors are not as strong and
spending per pupil could decline.
In summary, the regression results do not offer any insight into millage growth,
but they do suggest that industrial growth does not necessarily or clearly
increase the per-pupil resources of the school district, and in fact may result in
a decline if reductions in state aid because of higher taxpaying ability more than
offset the increases in local per pupil revenue.
District size and growth of the industrial base
Somewhat similar conclusions emerge by re-sorting districts in terms of both
size and growth of the industrial base. A composite variable was created that
weighted the growth rate of DOR-assessed property by the 1997 share of that
property in the tax base. A low score reflects either a limited industrial base, a
slow growth rate, or usually both, while a high score means a large industrial
share with rapid growth. There were fourteen districts with scores less than half
the state average on this weighted industrial growth measure measure, 30 that
were more than half but less than the state average, eighteen that were above the
state average by up to 50%, and 21 that were more than 50% above the state
average. Again, no clear pattern emerged for millage growth; average millage
growth from 1987-97 was actually much lower in the slowest growth/least
industrialized group of districts than the others. While there is no evidence that
industrial growth lowers the mill rate, there is some sketchy but inconclusive
evidence that faster industrial growth may raise the average mill rate. Table 6
summarizes the growth rates for both millage and per pupil local revenue by
size class in relation to the industrial growth measure just discussed. Table 7
provides the same information by level of fiscal autonomy.
The per pupil local revenue results are also consistent with the regression
findings. Per pupil revenue grew fastest in the group of counties that was up to
50% above the state average in weighted measure of industrial growth (up 80%
between 1987 and 1997). The fastest growing group saw an average 42%
increase in per pupil local revenue, while the slower-growing group of districts
saw per pupil local revenue grow only 16% over the decade, and the
slowest-growing group 33%. Again, the offsetting effect of distribution of state
aid probably accounts for the fact that per pupil revenue grew faster with growth
of the industrial base but was not translated into slower than average increase in
the mill rate.
Mill rate growth generally is lower for larger districts than for smaller ones, but
that pattern is much more pronounced for the mid-growth districts than for the
slowest and fastest growth counties. It is particularly noteworthy that this
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pattern reverses in the counties with larger industrial bases and/or faster
industrial growth, where the millage rate grows more rapidly in larger districts
than in smaller ones. If larger districts are more urban, this tentative finding
may suggest that the state's more densely populated districts are closer to the
national pattern observed earlier, where industrial development may actually
increase rather than decrease property tax rates.
The pattern of local revenue growth per pupil is more consistent, with the most
rapid growth in the smallest districts, regardless of what is happening to the
industrial base. However, the growth rate is also consistently higher for districts
with more rapid industrial growth, regardless of size, which is consistent with
the regression results described earlier.
Growth and fiscal autonomy
The impact of industrial growth is likely to be different in districts with
different degrees of fiscal autonomy. Table 7 summarizes the findings on this
question. Fiscal autonomy by itself does not have a great deal of explanatory
power for either the local mill rate or the growth in per pupil revenue. Mill rate
growth is actually lowest for the full autonomy districts, a finding that
contradicts the expectations that unrestricted ability to raise tax rates will result
in higher rates than in districts that do not enjoy that freedom. Local revenue
growth, likewise, has been slower in districts with full autonomy than in those
with limited or no autonomy. It is noteworthy, however, that the districts with
the weakest/slowest growing industrial base showed more willingness to raise
mill rates to fund schools than those with limited or no autonomy (up 43%
compared to 26-27% over the ten year period).
In situations of rapid industrial growth, local revenue per pupil has increased
more slowly in districts with full autonomy than in those with limited or no
autonomy. For other size groups, no clear pattern linking growth rates and fiscal
autonomy is evident.
Summary
This section examined a great deal of data to consider the impact of having a
large industrial component to the tax base and/or experiencing industrial growth
in a school district on such fiscal variables as the mill rate, local revenue per
pupil, total revenue per pupil, and per pupil spending. These factors were
considered overall as well as in relation to district size and degree of fiscal
autonomy. In general, having more industry in the tax base appears to have a
moderately positive impact in terms of lower mill rates and more local revenue
per pupil, but the effects are not strong. In the case of economic growth, the
benefits of additional local revenue are modest and more than offset by reduced
state aid as a result of a higher index of taxpaying ability. Small, less
industrialized districts appear to benefit more from new industry than larger,
more industrialized ones. The relationship between fiscal autonomy and any of
these effects of growth is tenuous at best, although there is some tendency to
higher mill rates in districts with full autonomy.
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Table 6
Industrial Growth, Fiscal Variables and District Size

Size Class

Growth in
Mill Rate
Per Pupil
Number
Increase
Local Revenue in Class
1987-1997
1987-1997

1 (< 2000) ADM

46%

85%

16

2 (2 - 6000) ADM

47

75

36

3 (6 - 12000) ADM

35

67

18

4 (12 - 24000) ADM

46

60

8

5 (> 24000) ADM

35

48

5

3-5 combined (> 6000) ADM

38

62

31

1 (< 2000 ADM)

26%

68%

5

2 (2 - 6000)ADM

41

65

4

3-4 (> 6000)ADM

27

53

5

1 (< 2000 ADM)

61%

103%

6

2 (2 - 6000)ADM

41

52

12

3-4 (> 6000)ADM

44

54

13

1 (< 2000 ADM)

78%

92%

3

2 (2 - 6000)ADM

67

93

9

3-4 (> 6000)ADM

23

62

6

1 (< 2000 ADM)

34%

105%

3

2 (2 - 6000)ADM

40

98

11

By Weighted Growth Rate:
Slowest Growth

Below Average Growth

Above Average Growth

Fastest Growth

6/21/2007 6:20 PM

Impact Study

18 of 40

http://www.strom.clemson.edu/teams/ced/impacts.html

47

3-4 (> 6000)ADM

85

7

Table 7
Industrial Growth, Fiscal Variables and Fiscal Autonomy
Mill Rate
Increase
1987-1997

Local Revenue
Growth
1987-1997

Growth in
Per Pupil
Number in
Class

42%

77%

31

Limited

52

78

30

Full

37

69

22

26%

62%

9

Limited
Autonomy

27

58

2

Full Autonomy

43

64

3

47%

64%

12

Limited
Autonomy

60

54

10

Full Autonomy

27

66

8

27%

61%

4

Limited
Autonomy

67

91

10

Full Autonomy

50

82

4

52%

105%

6

Fiscal
Autonomy
None

By Weighted Growth Rate:
Slowest Growth
No Autonomy

Below Average Growth
No Autonomy

Above Average Growth
No Autonomy

Fastest Growth
No Autonomy
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Limited
Autonomy

36

97

8

Full Autonomy

39

68

7

IV. Property Tax-Based Economic Development Incentives
South Carolina's economic development program includes many types of
incentives to help encourage a company to locate or expand in the state. Some
incentives are designed to reduce a company's corporate income tax liability.
Other incentives allow exemptions that can reduce sales and use taxes on
various types of equipment and purchases. Still other incentives reduce a
company's worker training costs. The list of incentives is quite extensive. South
Carolina is well known in the economic development industry as being very
successful and very aggressive in its economic development incentive packages.
Although the list of incentives in South Carolina is long and varied, the focus of
this study is the state's incentives that affect property taxes and in particular, the
property tax base of a school district. The impact on property taxes is critically
important to schools because property taxes are the primary source of local
revenue for schools. Other local governments, especially cities and counties,
also depend on property taxes are affected by these incentives, but not to the
same extent as schools. These other governments only rely on property taxes for
an average of 50% to 60% of their local revenue portion of their budgets.
School districts in South Carolina receive a large portion of their funds from
state sources, so property taxes only support a portion of total school funding.
The average school district in South Carolina receives about 60% of the funds
required for its operations from the state. This percentage varies according to
how wealthy a district is, ranging from a low of about 1% for the wealthiest
district to about 95% for the poorest district. But regardless of what proportion
of funds are provided by the state, nearly all of the funds that are required to be
generated locally must come from property taxes. In addition, almost all of the
debt service and capital improvement expenditures for schools must come from
local funds.
Therefore, since schools must rely heavily on property taxes to fund the local
share of their operating costs and most of their capital improvement costs, any
business incentive that affects the flow of property tax revenues is extremely
important to school districts.
Relevant economic incentives
The following economic development incentives can affect the property tax
base of a school district:
Tax Increment Financing Districts (TIF's)
Fee In Lieu of Taxes (FILOT)
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Special Source Revenue Bonds in Multi-County Industrial Parks
Tax Increment Financing Districts will only be addressed briefly in this report
for two reasons. The first is that while TIF's are an important economic
development tool, they are generally used for community development in cities
and counties rather than direct incentives offered to attract new industry. (The
original intent of the law was to redevelop blighted areas in decaying inner
cities.)
Second and perhaps more importantly, the state laws for TIF's were amended in
1999 to allow school districts the ability to choose whether to participate in a
TIF. Prior to 1999, a municipality could create a TIF and use school tax
revenues for up to fifteen years without the consent of the affected school
district. This opt-out provision gives school districts protection from having any
property tax revenues generated by millage assessed by the school district being
used for non-school purposes without the school district's consent. This change
has not eliminated the use and effectiveness of TIF's. Several TIF's have been
created in South Carolina since these changes were implemented. These TIFS
have included some where the school districts have participated and some
where they have declined.
The other incentives are used as direct incentives to attract new and expanding
industry and schools have no voice or vote in their use.
The following outline summarizes the detailed descriptions provided in
Appendix A. The major elements of these incentives are as follows:
Tax Increment Financing (TIFs)
Originally a potential loss of revenue to school districts
State law was amended in 1999 to allow School Districts the ability
to choose to participate in a TIF or not
School Districts protected and have a "vote" in negotiations

Fee-in-lieu-of-Taxes (FILOT) --- Outside a MCIP
Applies to manufacturing, not other classifications of property
Allows County Councils to lower Assessment Ratio from 10.5% to
6%
(and as low as 4% in large transactions) without the consent of the
affected school district.
Suspends ad valorem taxes and imposes "fees"
Can freeze millage rates for up to 30 years
School Districts generally protected but do not have a "vote" in
negotiations
Tax revenue is distributed in same manner and proportion as
millage rate, which generally protects school district's revenue from
use by the County.
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Multi-county industrial or business park (MCIP)
Multi-county agreement; many have one dominant and one nominal
county
No restriction on land area, time limit, or type of "industry or
business"
Can have FILOT in MCIP
All real and personal property is exempt from ad valorem taxes, but
"amount equivalent" to property tax is owed
County Councils assert the authority to determine how the
"equivalent amount" is distributed among taxing districts, including
all of FILOTS in the MCIP
School Districts are not protected

Special Source Revenue Bonds
Are available in MCIPs and FILOTs
Can lower tax revenues to all taxing entities through "credits"
School Districts do not have a "vote" in negotiations
County Councils assert the authority to determine how the
reductions affect taxing districts
School Districts are not protected
Illustrations of impact of incentives on school districts
As the following examples demonstrate, the FILOT within a MCIP and the
Special Source Revenue Bond incentives pose the greatest threat to a school
district's tax base. These two incentives can allow a county to redistribute the
"fees" (tax revenues) generated by the taxing entities in any way they want,
regardless of the relative share of the millage assessed by the taxing entities.
That is, the school district is not guaranteed that it will receive its fair share
(pro-rated share) of taxes from the property (regardless of the assessment ratio).
The following example may help illustrate this concept of "pro-rated" share.
First, assume a manufacturing company invests $10 million and the property is
outside any municipality, is not in a MCIP and does not negotiate a FILOT
agreement. Assume the mill rate in the county is 70 mills and the school
district's millage is 140 mills for a total of 210 mills. The county's share of the
total millage assessed on property is 33% (70/210 = 33%) and the school
district's share is 67% (140/210 = 67%). Without a FILOT agreement, the
company's property will be assessed at the constitutionally established 10.5%
rate. The company's property will have an assessed value of $1,050,000
($10,000,000 * .105 = $1,050,000). The company will pay a total of $220,500
in county property taxes -- $73,500 in county taxes ($10,000,000 * .105 * .070
= $73,500) and $147,000 in local school taxes ($10,000,000 * .105 * .140 =
$147,000). The school district will receive 67% of the taxes paid by the
company -- exactly in proportion to its prorated share of the total millage rate in
the county.
If it is assumed that the company negotiates a FILOT agreement and the
company's property is assessed at 6.0%, the company's property will have an
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assessed value of $600,000 ($10,000,000 * .06 = $600,000). The company will
pay a total of $126,000 in county property taxes -- $42,000 in county taxes and
($10,000,000 * .06 * .070 = $42,000) and $84,000 in local school taxes
($10,000,000 * .06 * .140 = $84,000).
Even though the company's assessment ratio is reduced so that it pays 43% less
taxes, the school district will still receive 67% ($84,000/$126,000 = 67%) of the
taxes paid by the company --- exactly in proportion to its prorated share of the
total millage rate in the county (67%).
The ability to reduce the overall property tax liability of the manufacturing
company is the intent of the law, because South Carolina's property taxes on
manufacturing property are the highest among our neighboring states. Even
when a company negotiates an assessment ratio of 6%, the firm's property taxes
will still be higher in South Carolina than in North Carolina or Georgia.
Originally, when the law was first passed in the late 1980s, the incentive was
only available to companies investing at least $85 million or more. However,
the minimum amount of investment for a company to be eligible has been
lowered several times over the last ten years and now is only $5 million. In fact,
in six extremely distressed counties, a minimum investment of only $1 million
is enough to be eligible for incentives. This reduction in the minimum
investment level has led to a proliferation of FILOT agreements across the
State.
The Horry County experience
The proliferation of FILOT agreements would not be as big a concern to the
school districts and as big a threat to their tax base if school districts were
guaranteed that they would always receive their prorated share of the property
tax revenues. The FILOT within a MCIP and the SSRB incentives do not
provide school districts this protection. The Ho Horry County case offers a good
illustration of how the current laws allow a county government to unilaterally
decide how the total property tax revenues are to be distributed and ultimately
to divert school funds from school purposes and keep the schools from
receiving their prorated share of taxes.
In the spring of 1999, the Horry County Council received a proposal by a large,
local development company to create a MCIP. The proposal called for the
creation of a Multi-County Industrial Park (MCIP) in the county and the City of
Myrtle Beach covering approximately 4,000 acres. The proposal would create a
MCIP for up to 30 years with an option to renew for another 30 years, facilitate
the annexation of several thousand acres of land into the City of Myrtle Beach,
freeze zoning and limit impact fees in the Park. However, the most important
aspect of the proposal to the Horry County School District was that it called for
the use 100% of commercial property tax revenues from the $2 billion of
investment to be diverted to non-educational purposes.
Under the original proposal, the school district would not receive their prorated
share of revenues from the property (estimated to be 56.1%) but was to receive
zero revenues (0%). Using the MCIP and SSRB laws, the proposal called for
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the county to redistribute tax revenues generated by the school district's millage
(113 mills) away from the school district and use them for non-school purposes
such as road, sewer, water and other infrastructure improvements. It was
estimated by the county that if the school district received their prorated share
of the property tax revenues, the school district would receive over $214 million
during the first 20 years of the MCIP. However, under the county's plan, the
district would receive nothing, i.e., would lose a potential $214 million. The
original proposal has been amended and the county now proposes to redistribute
only a share of the school district's revenue away from the district, not all of it.
Under the current proposal, about $25 million of the school district's prorated
share would be redistributed by the county to non-school purposes (during the
first 20 years of the 35-year MCIP). However, the school district is not
protected from future amendments to the agreement by the county council.
Other Agreements
The Horry County case is a good example of how the school districts are not
guaranteed that they will receive their prorated share of revenues from an
economic development project as these laws are currently written. But Horry
County is not the only current example. Another county in South Carolina was
recently successful in attracting a major economic development project to their
area. The company reportedly invested over $600 million. Because the
investment was more than $400 million, the company was eligible to negotiate a
FILOT assessment ratio of 4%, which it did (see Appendix A). Assuming $600
million in capital investment, an assessment ratio of 4% and the 1998 average
millage rate in the county of 225 mills, the company would pay approximately
$5.4 million a year in FILOT fees (property taxes). Of this $5.4 million, the
school district would receive approximately $3.0 million.
However, the FILOT agreement negotiated by the county council requires the
company to pay a net amount of only $900,000 in fees to the county a year for
the next 20 years and no fees at all for years 21-30. This fee agreement is
equivalent to an assessment ratio of about 6/10ths of 1%. The county issued
about $15 million is SSRB's for improvements for the company. In essence, the
county allowed the company to use its own tax payments to pay for some of its
development costs. And the school district's millage was used to generate about
two-thirds of these funds. According to the documents filed with the county, it
is unclear if the school district will receive any revenues from the $600 million
investment. By comparison, Union Camp invested about $600 million in a
facility in Richland County in 1992. This firm has paid over $41 million in fees
in the seven years since it signed a FILOT, an average of almost $6 million a
year.
As part of this research project, the 46 counties in South Carolina were
requested through a Freedom of Information Request (FOI) to provide
documentation on all FILOT, MCIP and SSRB agreements that have been
negotiated in their respective counties. To date, only 50% of the counties have
responded to the request. However, based on the responses, the above examples
are not exceptions but are fairly typical of many of the agreements counties are
negotiating.
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Growth in Use of FILOTs
The fiscal impacts on the state's school districts from these incentives are very
difficult to determine. At the present time, there are no statewide requirements
for counties to report the creation and use of multi-county industrial parks or the
use of special source revenue bonds. The South Carolina Department of
Revenue (SCDOR) collects data regarding FILOT agreements but does not
publish detailed data on the agreements.
The frequency of companies negotiating FILOT agreements has increased
dramatically in recent years. According to data from the SCDOR, there have
been over 320 FILOT agreements negotiated since the law was passed in 1987.
Since that time, the state has received approximately $226 million from
companies who have entered into FILOT agreements. In 1998, the state
received about $61 million in fees. The SCDOR reports that there are about 50
new agreements a year.
The minimum amount of investment required to be eligible to enter into a
FILOT has been reduced from the original $85 million, first $45 million in the
early 1990s and then in 1995 to $5 million. This change has led to more
widespread use of the incentive and has, for most practical purposes, eliminated
the 10.5% assessment on new industrial property. At $5 million, nearly any new
capital investment by a manufacturer will be eligible for a FILOT. With the
tremendous competition for new investment, most county councils will not be
able to keep from offering the lower 6% assessment ratio.
Based on data from the SCDOR, during the five-year period from 1989 and
1994, there were about five FILOT agreements negotiated per year. The average
amount of capital investment for these projects was about $157 million and the
average fee paid by these companies in 1998 was about $1 million. This
contrasts dramatically with the four-year period from 1995 and 1998 during
which there has been an average of about 75 FILOT agreements negotiated per
year. The average amount of capital investment for these 300 or so FILOT's was
about $15 million and the average fee paid by these companies in 1998 was
about $130,000.
SSRBs in South Carolina
Unfortunately, there is not much information on the use of SSRB's in South
Carolina. At this time, it is unknown how many SSRB's have been used and
how deeply they have impacted on the tax base of school districts. The
information gathered from the FOI requests does not provide much detail as to
amounts of SSRB's granted by the counties. However, the data do indicate that
their use is increasing and that most counties are granting SSRB credits to new
and expanding companies.
As the $600 million example above demonstrates, SSRB's can be used to reduce
a company's effective assessment ratio to less than 1% and legally can be used
to reduce it to zero. Based on information collected from some of the counties,
the use of SSRB's and credits is increasing in a similar manner to the use of
FILOT's. For example, one county granted SSRB's for a five-year period equal
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to 25% of the annual revenues to a company that was investing about $20
million. However, in the first year, they granted a special, one-time credit of
$125,000. This effectively reduced the company's tax payment to zero for the
first year. Thus, neither the county nor the school district received any tax
revenue form this company for the first year.
The same county negotiated another agreement for a company making a $200
million expansion. The company's facility was not in a MCIP so the county
created one for the expansion. Since the company invested $200, it was eligible
to negotiate a 4% assessment ratio. Had the county not placed the company in a
MCIP, the school district would have received its prorated share of the "fees" on
the $200 million assessed at 4%. Based on the district's 1998-99 millage rate,
this would have generated about $1.24 million a year for the school system.
However, the county specified in the MCIP agreements that no other taxing
entity except the county would receive any revenues from the new project in the
MCIP. Therefore the school system will receive zero tax revenues from a $200
million investment in the county.
Originally, the law allowed a bond to be issued by the county to fund
infrastructure improvements for a new industry of an expansion. However,
counties now have switched to the practice of reducing a company's annual
property tax payment by giving the company a credit against their property taxes
due. In some cases this has been as little as 10% of the tax liability and in others
as much as 100%.
Since a school district's millage normally represents about two-thirds of a
company's tax liability, this credit has the effect of reducing the school's
property tax revenues. The extent of the reduction statewide is unknown but is
obviously growing.
A major issue is whether schools have lost revenue because of these incentives.
It is very difficult to say for certain. It is clear that the use of the incentives are
widespread, and that many companies are paying lower taxes than they would if
the FILOT and SSRB laws did not require the county to include the school
district in its negotiations around the mill rate. However, many of the
companies that have invested in South Carolina since 1989 and have taken
advantage of these laws, may not have invested here and would have located in
another state if these incentives had not been available. Hence, it is very
difficult to determine the amount of school revenues that would have been
collected statewide if the industrial property currently assessed at less than
10.5% rather than the lower FILOT levels.
Estimated revenue losses from FILOT agreements
Unfortunately, the lack of sufficient data prohibits a comprehensive analysis of
the tax revenues that school districts have not received. At this time, the only
data available are the approximate number of agreements and the total fees
collected. To accurately determine the lost revenues, it is necessary to know the
exact assessment ratios negotiated, the exact length of terms of the agreements,
the exact mill rates incorporated in the agreements, etc.
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A preliminary estimate of the total school revenues that would have been
collected in the state can be made using available data. The methodology
incorporated in this analysis assumes average mill rates for school districts,
counties and cities. These averages are those published in the South Carolina
Budget and Control Board's June 1999 edition of "1998 Local Government
Finance Report, Fiscal Years 1991 to 1997." This analysis assumes that all fee
agreements were negotiated from 10.5% to 6%. It also assumes that all of the
property included in the FILOT was in unincorporated areas of the counties
(industrial property is generally outside city limits).
Statewide, the average county mill rate in FY 1997 was 54.5 mills. The average
school mill rate in FY 1997 was 136.3 mills. The school millage represents 71.4
percent of the total millage burden on real property. Of the $226 million in fees
collected to date, roughly 71.4% was generated by the mill rates assessed by the
schools. Assuming the school districts received their prorated share of the fees
generated from the total millage applied to the FILOT (71.4%), the schools
would have received approximately $161.4 million of the $226 million in fees.
The county governments would have received 28.6% or approximately $64.6
million over the last ten years or so.
However, if there were no FILOT agreements in place, the real and personal
property would have been assessed at the 10.5% ratio rather than the FILOT
lowered ratio of 6%. If this had been the case, the property that has generated
the $226 million in fees since 1987 would have generated $395.5 million
instead of $226 million. Of the $395 million, school districts would have
collected 71.4% or $282.4 million – about $121 million more than they received
under the FILOT agreements. In 1998 alone, school districts would have
received an additional $52.5 million more than they actually did.
It must be noted however, that the economic development community argues
that the schools did not forego any revenue. They argue that if the incentives
had not been offered to the companies, then the companies would have located
in another state, and the school districts would have received none of the
roughly $161 million that they did receive. There is substantial evidence that
this is the case in many of the larger economic development projects. South
Carolina's property taxes on manufacturing investments are substantially higher
than our neighboring states. Without some method of offsetting the higher
property tax burden on manufacturing, South Carolina would be in distinct
disadvantage relative to its neighbors.
It appears that as long as the school districts receive their prorated share of the
fees a company pays, regardless of whether the assessment ratio is 10.5%, 6%
or even 4%, the burden on the school districts from any reduction in assessment
ratios will be on an relatively equitable basis with the other local taxing entities.
However, even this statement needs to be qualified since as was stated earlier,
other local governments such as counties and cities are less dependent on
property taxes than schools do. In addition, any incentive that lowers a
company's tax payments needs to be evaluated on a cost benefit basis to the
incremental burden placed on the schools and the local government by the new
company and their employees.
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V. Overview of other States' Incentives
From the information provided to this point, it is clear that concern is growing
in South Carolina over the potential adverse effects of various economic
development incentives used by state and local governments to stimulate
economic expansion. In particular, the possibility of such programs impacting
the ability of these governments to provide needed public infrastructure,
including public schooling, has reached the level of public discussion. This
heightened awareness has been partially stimulated by the on-going and much
publicized discussion in Horry County between the Horry County Board of
Education and the Boroughs and Chapin Company over a proposed long term
Multi-County Development Project. Also, a recent five part series of articles in
the Baltimore Sun focusing on the proliferation of state and local economic
development projects, featured South Carolina as an example of excesses in this
area. To quote:
"On its current course, South Carolina will deliver what incentives critics have
been expecting for years: a striking case of incentives trauma. As the job war
escalated, critics figured, eventually some state would give away so much tax
revenue in the name of luring companies that it would jeopardize its fiscal
health. South Carolina is that state."
With such dramatic prose being printed on the subject, it is not surprising that
the discussion has risen to a new level in recent months.
Not only do the incentives remove potential revenue sources for funding
infrastructure needs, but the associated employment and population growth
generates ever-expanding pressures on existing facilities and programs. The
question being asked is whether local governments have been utilizing the
appropriate cost/benefit formulation when examining the desirability of such
incentives. Current methods of evaluation tend to ignore the fact that new jobs
in an area generate new residents to fill them, which is then followed by the
need for new schools, roads, police, fire protection and other governmental
services.
Of particular concern in the above discussion is the potential impact of the
state's economic development incentives programs on the ability to provide
adequate funding for public education. Recent occupants of the Governor's
Office have made K-12 education a cornerstone of their administrations. Much
discussion, planning and policy initiatives have centered on improving South
Carolina's standing in various measures of success in public education. Such
efforts are often discussed in terms of the positive impact that improvements in
education will have on economic development. The potential conflict is thus
obvious. Certain economic development tools (incentive programs) may
adversely effect the success of efforts to improve another important element in
this process (K-12 education). This is indeed the heart of the issue currently
being played out in Horry County.
The purpose of this section of the report is to provide a summary of the
evidence available on whether the above issue is viewed as significant for South
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Carolina's neighboring states. Also, evidence was collected to see if any steps
have been taken in these areas to protect school revenues from being eroded by
development incentives. Information is provided for Georgia, North Carolina
and Tennessee. To set the stage, trends in the financing of K-12 education are
examined in the following section. Information is provided for the country as a
whole, South Carolina, and the three neighboring states mentioned above.
Following this, the situation is considered for each neighboring state in
turn--Georgia, North Carolina, and Tennessee. We then consider the implication
of this information for South Carolina.
Revenues and Expenditures for Public Elementary and Secondary
Education
The average expenditure per student in U.S. public schools rose significantly
during the late 1980's. Between 1985-1986 and 1990-1991, current expenditures
per student in average daily attendance grew by 14 percent. This growth slowed
significantly during the first part of the 1990's, increasing by 5 percent between
1990-1991 and 1996-1997. By 1996-1997, the estimated current expenditure
per student in average daily attendance was $6,564.
Revenues raised for public elementary and secondary education totaled about
$305 billion for the 1996-1997 school year. This revenue ranged from a high of
$34 billion in California, which serves, about one in every eight students in the
country, to $643 million in North Dakota, which serves about one in every 380
students. Nationally, revenues increased an average of 6% over the previous
year. In the 1996-1997 school year, South Carolina had a total of about $3.9
billion available for K-12 education from all sources. This total is smaller than
that found for any of the neighboring states. Georgia had total revenues of 48.9
billion, North Carolina had $6.5 billion and Tennessee totaled $4.4 billion.
However, these states had larger student populations.
On a per pupil basis, South Carolina's expenditures compare more favorably to
its neighbors than do the total available revenue data. For the 1996-1997 school
year, South Carolina spent $5,050 per student as measured by the Fall 1996
student membership. This figure compares to $5,369 for Georgia, $4,929 for
North Carolina, and $4,581 for Tennessee. Thus, on a per student basis, South
Carolina lags behind only Georgia in terms of K-12 spending among
neighboring states.
Of particular interest to this study is the source of revenues for funding public
(K-12) education. The U.S. Department of Education reports data on four
specific sources of revenues for educational funding. These are:
Federal revenues include direct grants-in-aid to schools or agencies, funds
distributed through a state or intermediate agency, and revenues in lieu of taxes
to compensate a school district for nontaxable federal institutions within a
district's boundary.
Intermediate revenues come from sources that are not local or state agencies
but operate at an intermediate level between local and state educational agencies
and possess independent fund-raising capability.
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Local revenues include revenues from such sources and local property and non
property taxes, investments, and revenues from student activities, textbook
sales, transportation and tuition fees, and food service revenues.
State revenues include both direct funds from state governments and revenues
in lieu of taxation. Revenues in lieu of taxes are paid to compensate a school
district for nontaxable state institutions or facilities within the district's
boundary.
Nationally, the state share of revenues for public elementary and secondary
schools had grown steadily for many decades. This trend, however, began to
reverse in the late 1980s. Between 1986-1987 and 1994-1995, the state share of
total revenues dropped from 49.7 percent to 46.8 percent. At the same time
local (and intermediate) share increased from 43.9 percent to 46.4 percent. The
federal share also rose slightly during this period, from 6.4 percent to 6.8
percent.
The distribution of revenues by source for the states surrounding South Carolina
varies a fair amount from these national averages. For example, school districts
in all four states rely more on state revenues for K-12 revenues than the 46.8
percent national average for 1996-1997. North Carolina schools receive 65.4
percent of their revenues from state sources; Georgia's state share is 53.7
percent; South Carolina schools average 52.5 percent from state funds; and
Tennessee gets 48.5% from state coffers. To a somewhat lesser extent, school
districts in these states also rely more heavily on federal funding than do all
schools nationally. For example, 8.5 percent of Tennessee's school funding and
8.4 percent of South Carolina's come from federal sources. The national average
is 6.8 percent. North Carolina and Georgia follow with 7.2 percent and 6.8
percent respectively.
With state and federal sources playing a larger role in funding K-12 education in
these southern states, it follows that the local shares are smaller that the 46.4
percent national average. Indeed, North Carolina drew on local sources for only
27.4 percent of primary and secondary funding during the 1996-1997 school
year. South Carolina schools average 39.1 percent from local sources and
Georgia total 39.4 percent locally. Tennessee was closest to the national average
at 42.9 percent from local taxes.
While financial support for public elementary and secondary education has
grown significantly in the U.S. in the past, the rate of growth has decreased
during the 1990s. Also, there appears to have been a reversal in the trend for an
expanding reliance on state funds for public schools to more responsibility
falling on local taxpayers. However the four southern states reviewed all rely
more heavily on state and federal dollars for support than do the rest of the
country.
Development Incentives and School Financing: The State of Georgia
The State of Georgia lists a number of traditional economic development
incentives on the home page of the Georgia Department of Industry, Trade and
Tourism. Included are Income Tax Credits for job creation, investment
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generation and other activities such as child care, retraining and skills
education. These programs are based on a "tier" system which ranks the state's
counties from the least to most developed and the tax credits being scaled
accordingly. The state also offers sales tax exemptions for manufacturing
materials and machinery, inventory, pollution control equipment, material
handling equipment and electricity if it total 50 percent of product
manufacturing costs.
With the traditional reliance of local funding for schools coming from ad
valorem taxes on property, in particular real property, much of the concern
about development incentives and public education funding is focused on those
incentives that lower property tax payments to entice business development. In
Georgia, there is no statewide property tax abatement program. The only
property tax exemptions listed among the state's incentives are those that apply
to computer software and manufacturer's inventories. In the case of industrial
development bond financing, local communities in Georgia are sometimes able
to offer companies property tax relief, depending on the type of Development
Authority established and its legal powers. Such exemptions can occur if the
Development Authority is a Constitutional Development Authority (set up by
local constitutional amendments and given such power) and if the Authority is
the legal owner of the property under a "sale and leaseback" arrangement. If the
Development Authority does not have the power to grant exemption but does
have legal title to the property, the property financed by industrial development
bonds is exempt from ad valorem taxation, but the leasehold estate owned by
the company is subject to property taxes. These taxes are lower than if the
company actually had title to the property since the leasehold estate is assessed
at a lower rate than titled property.
Given the Development Authority option, local governments in Georgia are
able to employ property tax reductions and abatements to attract employers to
their communities. It also appears that such incentives are used quite frequently
by localities. In a report to the Georgia Budgetary Responsibility and Oversight
Committee, Keith Ihlanfeldt listed four major concerns over local use of the
property tax as a development incentive. These are:
The system pits local communities against each other which enhances the
companies bargaining power relative to the communities. Thus, local areas may
give away more than they would have without this competition.
The "playing field" is not even. Communities vary significantly in their ability
to offer property tax incentive. Thus, communities which stand to gain most
from job creation are those who can least afford the loss of property tax
revenue.
There is at least a perception that some communities are offering abatements
without the legal authority to do so.
There is a concern that some communities are trading better schools and other
public services for jobs. This will adversely impact the long term future of the
community and state.
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The extent and nature of local property tax abatements and reductions for
economic development purposes in Georgia is not know since there is no
organized or central reporting mechanism. It is clear from the above, however,
that the possible trade off between job creation and funding public schools is an
issue of concern with the current development efforts in the state of Georgia.
All four of the points highlighted above reflect this possibility.
In discussions with several individuals who follow educational financing issues
in Georgia, it did not appear that this was a controversial item for debate or
concern. One individual mentioned that in Georgia, areas could pass a local
sales tax option with the proceeds to be used for building new schools. This
option was viewed as a potential offset to any taxes lost through property tax
abatements. Several of these same individuals were aware, however, of the
discussion of these issues in South Carolina.
Development Incentives and School Financing: The State of North
Carolina
Economic development incentives offered in North Carolina are outlined in the
William S. Lee Quality Jobs and Business Expansion Act and administered by
the North Carolina Department of Commerce. This legislation, passed in 1996,
currently serves as the blueprint for economic development efforts in the state.
Like Georgia, North Carolina has a tiered development strategy, which ranks
counties by their development level and scales the development incentives
accordingly. The incentives offered involved state level tax credits for investing
firms based on such items as employment creation, investment in machinery
and equipment, investing in central administrative office property, expenditures
on research and development, plus credits for development zone projects.
At the local level, abatements or reductions in property taxes for development
purposes are illegal and virtually non-existent. There have been a few situations
where local governments have attempted to circumvent this law by offering
partial rebates of tax payments to firms locating in their jurisdiction. It is
believed, however, if this practice expands, its legality will certainly be tested in
court.
Local governments are able to offer other forms of incentives to attract business
to their area. They can and do offer land, roads, utility connections and other
infrastructure support as economic development incentives. Local areas also
benefit from the statewide income or franchise tax credits outline in the first
paragraph of this section. It is the case, however, that property tax abatements or
reductions are not allowed in North Carolina.
Local infrastructure needs, including support for public schools, could be an
issue as resources are diverted to support the location of new firms in North
Carolina communities. However, the connection is less direct than a situation
where property taxes are reduced to promote economic development. In
discussions with individuals who are knowledgeable about economic
development incentives in North Carolina, the pressure of local incentives on
funding of public schools is not currently an issue of concern in this state.
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Development Incentives and School Financing: The State of Tennessee
The State of Tennessee offers a variety of tax incentives for firms locating in the
state. Included are a 1% corporate excise tax credits for the purchase,
installation and/or repair of qualified industrial machinery, the purchase of
qualified equipment associated with the required $500,000 capital investment
by a distribution or warehouse facility, and the purchase of computers,
computer networks, and the like purchased to reach the required capital
investment in order to qualify for the jobs tax credit. The state also provides a
tax credit of $2,000 (or $3,000 in economically distressed counties) per new
full-time employee for businesses that meet requirements of a minimum 25 new
full-time jobs and additional capital investment of $500,000 and offer at least a
minimal health care plan. Reduced (or elimination of) sales and use taxes are
also granted on a variety of business purchases such as certain industrial
machinery and equipment and use of energy fuel and water.
The situation with respect to local incentives involving property taxes in
Tennessee is similar to that found in Georgia. A local Industrial Development
Authority can issue industrial bonds a project. As the legal owner, the Authority
is exempt from property taxes. The local government then negotiates a
fee-in-lieu-of-taxes with the firm which is below the prevailing real property tax
rate. This practice is widespread in Tennessee with an estimated 90% of such
activity involving manufacturing facilities.
Unlike Georgia, however, Tennessee has had a "disclosure law" covering such
activities since 1992. Specifically, legislation passed in Tennessee requires:
"All economic development agreements should be reduced
to writing and submitted to the chief executive officer of each
jurisdiction in which the property is located and to the
comptroller of the treasury, for review, but not approval. The
agreement may be submitted in advance of its execution but
must be submitted within ten days after its execution. The
name of private business entities which are parties to the
agreement may be obscured on copies of agreements
submitted in advance of their execution. (Acts 1992, ch.
1000, para 3.)"
While this reporting requirement does not involve approval of such agreements,
it could provide a method of keeping track of the pervasiveness of such
activities and identify those areas where the funding for other local needs (such
as public schools) might be at risk.
Thus, like Georgia, Tennessee has a local economic development system which
could potentially endanger the ability to fund schools from local property tax
revenues. Such discussion has recently occurred in Nashville where a package
of both state and local incentives was put together to attract a Dell Computer
plant. Concern centered on the relatively low average wage of the plant and the
opportunity costs of the concessions given. To this point, however, the issue of
school financing and local development incentives has not become an issue of
major concern in Tennessee.
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Summary
This section examined the relationship between local economic development
incentives and funding of local schools for several southern states. The intent
was to provide a brief overview of the economic development scene for South
Carolina's neighbors and the degree to which public education funding may be
at risk because of these programs.
All of South Carolina's neighbors have a similar portfolio of state level
economic development incentives. In terms of local economic development
incentives and property taxes in particular, differences do exist between this
group of states. First, in North Carolina, abatements or reductions in real
property taxes for development purposes do not exist. Other incentives can be
offered, but tapping the local property tax base, which is a major source of
school revenues, is not one of the choices. In Georgia and Tennessee, local
development authorities become "owners" of the property and as such are not
subject to property taxes. Reduced fees are assessed which in essence lowers the
actual tax rate on the property of concern. None of the states contacted,
however, had an economic development incentive program similar to South
Carolina's multi-county business park with special source revenue bonds.
In terms of special protection for schools from local development efforts, no
evidence of such regulations or policies were found. Discussions with local and
state development officials did not turn up a real feeling of concern of this issue.
As noted, Tennessee has had some discussion over the wisdom of certain large
scale, high profile projects but none where the specific focus was on funding of
local public education. Also, as one individual from North Carolina noted,
South Carolina plays the economic development game with a much larger and
varied set of development tools than any of its neighbors.

VI. Summary
The purpose of this report is to examine economic development incentives in
South Carolina that reduce property taxes and in so doing so, may adversely
affect a school district's ability to provide adequate funding for public
education.
These incentives and their associated diversion of funds for economic
development are one of the more recent economic development tools employed
in South Carolina. Over the years, first the federal government and then state
governments have utilized a variety of incentives to created economic
opportunities for less developed or distressed regions. South Carolina is well
known in the economic development industry as being very successful and very
aggressive in its economic development incentive packages.
As noted in Chapter II, the efficiency and equity of such activities have come
under increasing scrutiny and the study reviews the various arguments
associated with this discussion. Of particular relevance is the observation that
such incentives have historically been for distressed regions with low incomes
and high unemployment. This may be less true today with more well-to-do areas
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utilizing incentives to attract additional economic activity. Further, critics point
out that such activities divert dollars from the improvement of public services
which may have a greater social benefit than that associated with the
development activity. This possibility could be particularly relevant for public
education needs in rapidly growing regions of the state. In these areas, the
pressure on public infrastructure (including public schools) is already
significant. The additional demand created by the development activities plus
the diversion of financial resources could potentially create significant problems
for the future of school districts in these areas.
One way to approach this issue is to empirically examine the relationship
between economic development and school finances. Since the objective of all
development incentives is to promote economic expansion of the area, such data
yields important insights into the process. Thus, Chapter III focuses on the
impact of nonresidential development on school finances in South Carolina.
Nonresidential (industrial and utilities) development is used since these are the
sectors that economic development incentives are generally intended to impact.
A great deal of data is analyzed to determine if there is any strong statistical
relationship between the size of an area's industrial base and /or growth of that
base on fiscal variables such as mill rate, local revenue per pupil, and per pupil
spending. It is observed that having a large industrial base seems to have a
modest but positive impact with lower mill rates and higher revenue per pupil.
In terms of industrial growth, the positive benefits of additional local revenue
are modest and more than offset by reductions in state aid resulting from the
higher index of tax paying ability. One of the more interesting results of this
statistical work is that school districts in small, less industrialized areas appear
to benefit more from growth than those in larger, more industrialized areas. The
end result of this analysis is that little evidence exists supporting the notion that
industrial development per se has a major impact on school financial variables.
As noted above, the focus of this report is on economic development incentives
directed toward reducing the property tax liability of firms. This involves
reducing the tax rate on local property for firms who are willing to invest in the
area. By doing so, the property tax liability is reduced, the cost of doing
business is lowered and firms are attracted to the area. The concern for schools
is that basically all funds that are required to be generated locally must come
from property taxes. In addition, the majority of capital improvement
expenditures are similarly funded from property tax revenues.
The key property tax-based economic development incentives, which are
examined in Chapter IV of the report, are Fee In Lieu of Taxes (FILOT) and
Special Source Revenue Bonds (SSRB) in Multi-County Industrial Parks. To
promote economic development, counties have interpreted that Article X of the
South Carolina Constitution allows them to negotiate with a company to pay a
Fee instead of paying property taxes. So manufacturing firms, who would
normally be assessed at 10.5%, can enter into an agreement with a county to
reduce its assessment ratio down to 6% without the knowledge or consent of the
affected school district. This could even be as low as 4% for a very large
investment. Originally, the law concerning FILOTs allowed such reductions for
only very large investments ($85 million or more). This amount has be lowered
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over the years so that now such tax breaks are available for investment levels of
only $5 million (and as low as $1 million in six counties).
However, research for this study found one South Carolina County had given a
company such a large SSRB credit that it effectively lowered the company's
assessment ratio to less than 1%. Another County negotiated a FILOT
agreement with a company that was investing $200 million and in the
agreement, the county prohibited the school district from receiving any of the
tax revenues from the project -- a loss to the school district of over $1.24
million a year.
As the numerical example in Chapter IV shows, even though a negotiated
FILOT incentive lowers the overall level of taxes paid by the company, school
districts will still receive the same share of the "fees" paid as they would have
received without the incentive. So a school district whose mill rate is 67% of
the total will receive 67% of the Fees collected form the company. FILOTs have
become a very popular economic development tool in South Carolina.
Of more concern to school financing in South Carolina is the use of FILOT
agreements within Multi-County Industrial Parks (MCIP) and SSRB incentives.
Here, school districts are not guaranteed that they will always receive their
prorated share of the property tax revenues since the County Council negotiates
the agreement and doesn' t have to notify or have consent from the school
district. Instead, it is possible to divert all or a portion of revenues that would
have gone to the schools to support Special Source Revenue Bonds (SSRB) or
other county expenditures. With SSRBs, funds from the bonds are then used to
support the infrastructure investment associate with the development project
(roads, sewerage, etc.). A much-publicized case in Horry County involves just
this type of development proposal.
It is very difficult to estimate the impact of these incentives on the state's school
districts. Preliminary projections in this study estimate that school district
revenues would have been more than $121 million greater than they were had
all manufacturing property been assessed at the normal 10.5% rather than the
lower 6% allowed by FILOTs. At the present time, there are no statewide
requirements for counties to report the creation and use of multi-county
industrial parks or the use of special source revenue bonds. Data is thus
unavailable to even begin such an effort. Further, there is no definitive answer
to the development community's argument that without the incentive, the
schools would have received no funds since the companies would have located
in other states. It is clear, however, that the use of FILOTs within MCIPs and
using SSRBs puts the schools in double jeopardy in that not only is the pie
smaller, but they are likely to receive a smaller share of that pie – all without the
school board's knowledge or consent.
The last topic covered in the report is a review of South Carolina's neighboring
states' property tax related incentives (Chapter V). All of neighboring states
examined (Georgia, North Carolina and Tennessee) have a similar portfolio of
state level economic development incentives. This includes a variety of state
business income or franchise tax credits tied to either investment levels and/or
job creation. Also they implement a similar tiered or layered approach where the
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size of the tax credit is inversely related to the economic vitality of the locale.
That is, the tax credit increases for firms that locate in poorer regions of the
state.
In terms of local economic development incentives and property taxes in
particular, differences do exist between this group of states. First, in North
Carolina, abatements or reductions in real property taxes for development
purposes do not exist. Other incentives can be offered, but tapping the local
property tax base, which is a major source of school revenues, is not one of the
choices. In Georgia and Tennessee, local development authorities become
"owners" of property and as such are not subject to property taxes. Reduced fees
are assessed which in essence lowers the actual tax rate on the property of
concern. None of the state contacted, however, had an economic development
program similar to South Carolina's multi-county business park with special
source revenue bonds.
The above results should serve as an alert to those concerned with public
education in South Carolina. The study recognizes the many benefits that the
citizens of the state have enjoyed as the result of past economic development
efforts. Investment in public education has also been one of the tools of
economic development and should be recognized as such. Thus, funding public
education and economic development packages should be complements, not
competitors, in this effort. What is needed is a more careful evaluation of the
growing number of incentive packages in a true public cost/benefit framework
so that the opportunity costs of foregone revenues and the additional demands
on public infrastructure (including schools) are given appropriate weight in the
decision process. An important first step in this process would be a more
formalized reporting process involving the use of FILOT and SSRB so that such
decisions can be made in the light of better data.
A second step should be to seek legislative changes in the economic
development incentives law so that school districts will be better protected from
the involuntary loss of revenues. A well-balanced incentive program should
ensure this protection to the school districts while still preserving the State's
highly successful economic development programs.

Appendix A
The following descriptions are verbatim excerpts from the South Carolina
Department of Revenue publication; South Carolina Tax Incentives for
Economic Development 1999 Edition, pp. 69-133.
1. Fee In Lieu of Taxes
Under Article X of the South Carolina Constitution, manufacturing real or
personal property is assessed at 10.5% of its fair market value. Commercial
personal property is assessed at 10.5%, while commercial real property is
assessed at 6%. To promote the growth of manufacturing within this State, the
Legislature enacted three Fee in lieu of property tax statutes (referred to as "Fee
in lieu" or "Fee".) The first Fee in lieu statute was enacted in South Carolina

6/21/2007 6:20 PM

Impact Study

37 of 40

http://www.strom.clemson.edu/teams/ced/impacts.html

Code #4-29-67 and is commonly referred to as the "Big Fee." The second
statute is contained in Chapter 12 of Title 4 and is commonly referred to as the
"Little Fee." The third statute was enacted in the "Fee in Lieu of Tax
Simplification Act of 1997" and is referred to as the "Simplified Fee." Special
Fee in lieu provisions exist for very large investments. These provisions are
known as the "Super Fee" with respect to the Little and Big Fee and as the
"Enhanced Investment Fee" with respect to the Simplified Fee. Property subject
to the Fee usually consists of land, improvements to land, and/or machinery and
equipment (excluding some mobile property) located at a project. See South
Carolina Revenue Rulings #93-7 and #97-21. The Fee statutes permit a
company to negotiate to pay a Fee instead of paying property taxes. The 10.5%
assessment ratio can be, and often is, negotiated to 6% (4% for very large
investments under the Super Fee or Enhanced Investment Fee.) In addition, the
company and the county can agree to freeze the millage rate applicable to the
property at the current millage rate, or adjust the millage rate every five years,
for the period the Fee is in effect. During the period of the Fee, the value of
personal property is deemed to decrease each year by a statutory depreciation
rate (subject to a 10% floor) while the value of real property remains constant,
and therefore, is not subject to inflation. The period of the Fee is 20 years for
each item of property (30 years for the Super and Enhanced Investment Fee)
with an overall limit of 27 years (37 years or 40 years for the Super and
Enhanced Investment Fee, respectively). The additional 7 years allows for a
7-year period to complete the project and have property at the project subject to
the Fee and still obtain the maximum 20 or 30 years for each item of property.
Super And Enhanced Investment Fee
Both the Little and Big Fee contain a provision that allows certain entities to
apply for a Super Fee. The Simplified Fee contains an equivalent provision, but
calls it an
Enhanced Investment Fee. The Super or Enhanced Investment Fee may be equal
to what the property tax would have been if the property was assessed at 4%. In
addition to a possible assessment ratio of 4%, if a company qualifies for the
Super Fee, the company has 8 years from the end of the property tax year in
which the lease agreement is executed to make the investment required by the
statute and may obtain 10 years to complete the project. If the company is under
the Enhanced Investment Fee, the company has from 60 days before the county
takes action identifying the project until 8 years from the last day of the property
tax year in which the first piece of economic development property is placed in
service to make the required level of investment and may obtain up to 10 years
to complete the project. The first piece of property must be placed in service no
later than 3 years from the end of the property tax year in which the company
and the county enter into a Fee agreement. If the property is subject to the Super
or Enhanced Investment Fee, qualifying property may be subject to the Fee for
30 years. For those projects placed in service in more than one year, the Fee is
available for a maximum of 37 years for the Super Fee, and 40 years for the
Enhanced Investment Fee. South Carolina Code ##4-12-30(C)(3) and (D)(4),
4-29-67(C)(3) and (D)(4), 12-44-30(9), (13), and (20), and 12-44-40(D).
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The following types of companies may qualify for the Super or Enhanced
Investment Fee:
1. A company which invests at least $200 million, which when added to the
previous investments, results in a total investment of at least $400
million, and which is creating at least 200 new full-time jobs at the site
qualifying for the Fee.
2. A company which invests at least $400 million and creates at least 200
new full-time jobs at the site qualifying for the Fee.
3. A limited liability company in conjunction with one or more of its
members which makes a $400 million investment in a least developed or
under developed county and which creates at least 100 new jobs with an
annual average compensation of $40,000 at the site subject to the Fee.
(See South Carolina Code #12-6-3360, the job tax credit statute.) The
company has four years from the date of the millage rate agreement to
hire the new employees.
Additionally, a company which invests at least $600 million in South Carolina
can qualify for the Super Fee if it is using the provisions of the Big Fee for its
Fee transaction. For purposes of the Little and Big Fee, the new full-time job
requirements described in items 1-3 above do not apply to any company which
for more than 25 years ending on the date of the agreement paid more than 50%
of all property taxes actually collected in the county where it is seeking the Fee.
For purposes of the Simplified Fee, if a company paid more than 50% of the
property tax in the county for the 25-year period and invests $400 million at the
site (item 2 above), then it does not have to meet any new job requirement.
2. Multi-County Industrial Parks
South Carolina Code #4-1-170 provides that a multi-county industrial park can
be established by two or more counties pursuant to a written agreement between
those counties as provided in Section 13 of Article VIII of the South Carolina
Constitution. That agreement must include provisions which address the
development of the park, the sharing between the participating counties of the
expenses and revenues relating to the park, and the manner in which such
revenues must be distributed to each of the taxing entities within each of the
participating counties. The park area is exempt from property tax. The owners
or lessees of any property situated in the park must pay an amount equivalent to
the property taxes or other fee in lieu of payments that would have been due and
payable.
3. Special Source Revenue Bonds
In connection with a Little or Big Fee, a county (or municipality or special
purpose district) where the project will be located may issue special source
revenue bonds. These special source revenue bonds allow the political
subdivision to generate revenue for infrastructure projects usually at or
surrounding the project that enhance its economic development, and then to pay
back the bonds with money it receives from the Fee payments from the project.
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The rules regarding special source revenue bonds are contained in South
Carolina Code #4-29-68. Special source revenue bonds cannot be used with the
Simplified Fee.
To issue special source revenue bonds, the governing body of the issuer (or
county) must adopt an ordinance calling for the issuance of the special source
revenue bonds, hold a public hearing, and then pass a resolution authorizing the
issuance of the bonds. The bonds must be issued solely for the purpose of
providing infrastructure that benefits the issuer's economic development. Bonds
may be issued for improved and unimproved real property on which the project
will be located. The face of the bonds must provide that they are payable solely
from the proceeds of the Fee, are not secured by the full faith and credit of the
issuer, are not payable from any tax or license, and are not a pecuniary liability
of the issuer or a charge against the issuer's general credit or taxing power. The
bonds can be issued as a single issue or several issues. The bonds can be
payable in installments. The bonds may be sold at public or private sale, and the
expenses of the issuance of the bonds may be paid out of the bond proceeds. A
county, municipality or special purpose district that receives and retains
revenues from a Fee can also use a portion of the revenue received from the Fee
for the purposes of providing infrastructure or providing unimproved or
improved real estate for the project without the requirement of issuing special
source revenue bonds. If the special source revenue bonds are issued to a third
party, and the project should fail to generate the necessary Fee payments to pay
off the bonds, the company that is subject to the Fee must make up any
shortfall.

Appendix B
Most and Least Industrialized School Districts
District
Percent Industrial
Subgroup A
Clarendon 3
Clarendon 2
Marion 3
Marion 4
Jasper
Florence 4
Barnwell 19
Saluda
Dillon 1
Lexington 4
York 4
McCormick
Spartanburg 1
Subgroup D

7.2
8.5
8.8
9.4
9.9
10.7
12.1
12.4
13.1
13.2
14.0
14.3
14.5
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Lexington 1
York 2
Fairfield
Greenwood 52
Spartanburg 3
Allendale
Spartanburg 5
Florence 5
Calhoun
Oconee
Cherokee
Darlington
Anderson 3
Barnwell 29

88.6
66.9
58.0
52.3
50.3
48.1
45.0
44.0
42.4
41.1
39.4
39.2
37.6
36.2
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